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ABSTRACT 
The type of explanation characteristic of science is causal, 
and it is natural to think that this type of explanation is 
appropriate for all events, no matter what their nature. It is 
this global assumption that is questioned in this thesis. 
Chapter One presents a historical exposition of the 
development of causal explanation since the time of David Hume. 
The perennial theme has been the conceptual separability of 
causally related events and the need to insert an empirical law 
to deduce one from the other. Karl Popper (the subject of 
Chapter Two) has also used this deductive feature of causal 
explanation, and even argues for the unity of science, social and 
natural, on the strength of it. Throughout this tradition social 
behaviour is supposedly caused and requires the same kind of 
explanatory apparatus as any other behaviour. 
The Wittgensteinian tradition (Chapter Three) opposes any 
such tradition by emphasizing the importance of normative rules 
governing human action, as opposed to any causal relations. In 
particular, the conceptual notion of a 'criterion of identity' is 
investigated in relation to both the natural and social sciences, 
and it is concluded that the logic of explanation works very 
differently in these two disciplines. This is so for two 
reasons. First, because the criteria of identity for any concept 
are logically, not contingently, related to that concept; and as 
the criteria for any action are the surrounding contexts, then 
those surrounding contexts cannot be the causes of the behaviour 
concerned in any Humean sense. Second, the criteria of identity 
are not imposed upon social phenomena from 'without', as is the 
case in the natural sciences; they are constituted from within, 
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and thus a social science must base the rules it uses upon the 
criteria belonging to the group being studied rather than the 
group of researchers studying it. 
Social scientists cannot then give a causal explanation of 
human behaviour. But they can explain it by giving reasons; that 
is, by showing how the behaviour is conceptually related to the 
context by classifying it under the appropriate logical category. 
This point is emphasized in an investigation of the so-called 
'Rationality Principle' in Chapter Four. Popper asserts that 
'rational' behaviour is an 'appropriate' (causal) response to a 
particular problem situation; 'appropriate' being in accordance 
with the objective or brute facts. But the Wittgensteinian point 
remains however, i.e. that the problem which any agent is 
responding to is conceptually linked to that action and cannot 
therefore the cause of it. Furthermore, rationality cannot be 
measured against any Popperian 'objective' or 'brute' facts; 
rather, rational behaviour is so according to certain human 
conventions, and these conventions are normative rather than 
objective in the Popperian sense. Rational behaviour is not then 
behaviour in accordance with the 'facts', but behaviour in 
accordance with relative normative criteria of rationality. 
In conclusion, it is wholly inappropriate to explain human 
behaviour in terms of 'causes' and 'objective facts'. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If asked to name that which most distinguishes twentieth 
century Western culture from all other cultures, most of us would 
draw attention to the achievements of science and technology. So 
useful and pervasive have they become in our everyday lives, and 
so drastically has science altered our world view by ridding us 
of superstitious and irrational beliefs, that we feel as if there 
is nothing that science could not, in principle at least, give a 
full account of. What concerns me in the following pages is one 
of the few remaining subjects that science has not yet been able 
to fully explain -- human behaviour. 
Galileo began the process of diminishing the mysteriousness 
of human beings by making the sun the focus of the universe 
instead of homo sapiens. Darwin carried this reduction still 
further by making human beings a product of the inexorable laws 
of nature in just the same way as all other animals and plants --
ideas of a grand purpose or design in nature became intellectual 
nonsense. The last aspect of human beings to be explained is the 
mind. Is it just a causal mechanism like the human body? Or is 
it somehow different? There is much hanging on this question, 
especially when we are reminded that the concept of mind includes 
those features that make human beings unique -- they can, amongst 
other things, think, argue, calculate, plan, decide, understand, 
and engage in all manner of social activities. No animals or 
plants do such things, and thus it is just these sorts of 
activities that distinguish us from them. The problem remains of 
how such activities can be accounted for. Given the enormous 
successes that science has achieved, we feel confident that there 
should be no difference in principle between explaining the 
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regularities observed in human behaviour and those shown in £lie 
behaviour of planets, plants, and both the lower and higher 
animals. Given the time and technical expertise in the 
laboratory, it is often claimed, then in theory all that is 
required is persistence for the behaviour that makes human beings 
unique to be fully explained by science. Indeed, it is further 
claimed, it will in fact be the case. 
It is this last claim that I wish to examine and question in 
this dissertation. This I do by comparing several different 
philosophical traditions. In the first chapter the concept of 
cause and causal explanation in both the natural and social 
sciences is examined by tracing its development and increasing 
sophistication through the empiricist philosophies of Hurne, Mill, 
and Hempel. The type of explanatory account of human behaviour 
to be examined in Chapter Two is that given by the very 
influential philosopher of science, Karl Popper. He claims to 
have escaped the empiricist tradition and attempts to give a 
different basis for the explanation of human behaviour in light 
of his new philosophy of science and evolutionary epistemology. 
In Chapters Three and Four, the last tradition discussed is the 
new philosophy of Wittgenstein, Winch, and Searle, and the 
implications it has for the philosophies discussed in Chapters 
One and Two. 
The whole of this dissertation takes, in effect, the form of 
a reductio. This can be best shown by the following schema. 
(1) Chapters One and Two consist of an investigation of the 
logical nature of causal explanation. 
(2) Chapters Three and Four show that the phenomena of human 
behaviour cannot meet these logical requirements. 
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(3) It follows, therefore, that human behaviour cannot be 
causally explained. This has the corollary, of course, 
that because scientific explanation is causal, then human 
behaviour cannot be a proper subject matter for scientific 
investigations. 
After establishing these negative theses I try to show, with 
examples, how one actually should go about explaining human 
behaviour. This is done by using a type of explanation which is 
not of the same logical kind as that used in science, but is 
nonetheless perfectly respectable in its own right. Finally, in 
Chapter Five I attempt a diagnosis of why we have been so easily 
lured into mistakenly thinking that science is the only way to 
properly enlighten us, and an explanation of why we should 
instead regard science as just one of the activities that we do, 
there being others that are at least as important, and some more 
so in governing our everyday practices in life. 
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